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VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS:
RETHINKING FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN
JUVENILE JUSTICE
The problem of the delinquent child, though juristically
comparatively simple, is, in its social significance, of the
greatest importance, for upon its wise solution depends the
future of many of the rising generation.'
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, juveniles have accounted for a larger share
of violent criminal activity than ever before.2 In response to the rise
in violent juvenile crime, the public has demanded that violent
juvenile offenders be held accountable for their actions. To placate
popular support for greater accountability, many state legislatures
enacted laws imposing greater punishment on juveniles.3 This
modem punitive approach to juvenile delinquency, however,
I. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104 (1909). Judge Mack's
article, written over 85 years ago, describes the revolutionary changes in juvenile justice that
resulted from the creation ofjuvenile courts.
2. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES (116th ed. 1996) [hereinafter 1996 ABSTRACT]. The number of juvenile
arrests for violent crime rose from 77,220 in 1980 to 97,103 arrests in 1990 to 125,141 arrests
in 1994, an increase of over 62% between 1980 and 1994. Id. at 208 tbl. 324. The Abstract
defines juveniles as persons between the ages of 10 and 17. Id. Violent crimes include murder,
forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Id. See also infra Part I.B for discussion of the
increase in violent juvenile offenders.
3. See infra Part II.B.
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contradicts the rehabilitative philosophy historically underlying
juvenile justice.4
When state legislatures first established juvenile courts at the
close of the nineteenth century,5 most acts of delinquency involved
relatively minor misconduct. Today, children of all ages carry
weapons to school and commit crimes of violence.' The violent
nature of modem juvenile delinquency presents a far greater danger
to society.' Moreover, unlike traditional acts of delinquency, such
serious violent conduct causes significant harm not only to the
victims of violence but also to the surrounding community.
4. See infra Part L.A for discussion of the rehabilitative approach ofjuvenile courts.
5. For a review of the history of juvenile courts, see ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD
SAVERS (1969); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 1187 (1970).
6. Delinquent acts ranged from relatively minor transgressions such as tardiness at
school to more serious acts such as theft. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and
Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV.
1083, 1098 (1991) (noting "smoking, sexual activity, stubbornness, running away from home,
swearing, and truancy" as grounds for juvenile court jurisdiction); see also BARRY KRISBERG &
JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE 66 (1993) (listing conduct that constituted
juvenile delinquency under most statutes during the 1950s and 1960s); PLATT, supra note 5, at
4-9 (reviewing the origins ofdelinquency).
7. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, WEAPONS IN SCHOOLS 1 (1989) (stating that "between July 1, 1987 and June 30, 1988,
California school officials confiscated 8,539 weapons, including 789 guns'). See also JOSEPH F.
SHELEY & JAMES D. WRIGHT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUN ACQUISITION AND POSSESSION IN
SELECTED JUVENILE SAMPLES (1993). A sample of 758 male students in 10 inner-city high
schools indicated that 22% owned guns and 6% owned three or more guns. Id. at 2-5. The
survey also indicated that 12% of the students who owned guns reported currently carrying a
gun "all" or "most of the time" and another 23% did so at least "now and then." Id. at 5. Three
percent of the students claimed they carried a gun to school "all" or "most of the time" and 6%
did so "now and then." Id. In 1994,3,000 juveniles were charged with criminal homicide; 5,400
with forcible rape; 37,000 with robbery; 85,300 with aggravated assault; and 177,700 with
simple assault. JEFFREY A. BUTTS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DELINQUENCY CASES IN JUVENILE
COURT, 1994 (Fact Sheet No. 47) (1996) [hereinafter DELINQUENCY CASES 1994]. For further
discussion ofjuvenile violence and the effect of guns on delinquency, see DAVID HUIZINGA ET
AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, URBAN DELINQUENCY AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE 18 (1994)
(describing the correlation between gun ownership and delinquency).
8. See infra Part MI.B.
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Historically, states were responsible for establishing and
administering juvenile justice systems with little intervention by the
federal government.9 As the rate and severity of juvenile delinquency
increased throughout the twentieth century, however, Congress
expressed greater interest in asserting control over certain juvenile
matters.' ° Recently, Congress addressed violent juvenile offenders by
enacting tougher laws that allow the criminal prosecution of juveniles
in federal court." In addition, legislation is pending in the Senate that
would reshape federal juvenile law and encourage states to adopt a
more punitive approach to serious juvenile offenses.' 2
Because actual or threatened federal intervention is likely to
persist until violent juvenile crime is adequately curtailed, this Note
examines the need for federal intervention to address the states'
failure to control juvenile crime. Part I discusses the foundations of
juvenile justice and the historical roles the state and federal
governments have played in the evolution of juvenile justice. Part II
reviews the theoretical justifications of punishment in the context of
juvenile justice. Part III discusses state efforts to control violent
juvenile offenders and presents statistical data demonstrating the
failure of present juvenile justice measures to effectively curb the
growth of violent juvenile crime. Part IV examines the Violent and
Repeat Juvenile Offender Reform Act of 1997, a bill introduced in
the Senate at the beginning of the 105th Session of Congress. Part IV
concludes that Congress should enact the bill after incorporating
several proposed amendments.
9. See infra Part I.A-I.B for discussion of state and federal involvement in juvenile
justice.
10. See infra Part I.B. In addition to Congress, since the 1960s the Supreme Court has
significantly extended constitutional protections to juvenile offenders. See infra Part I.B.2.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Reform Act of 1997, S. 10, 105th Cong.
(1997). For further discussion of this bill, see infra Part IV.
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I. HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
A. Juvenile Courts
Modem juvenile justice systems trace their roots back to the
Progressive Era of the late nineteenth century.' 3 Prior to the
establishment of juvenile courts, children who committed crimes
were subject to the same criminal proceedings and penalties as
adults.'4 Progressive reformers, however, viewed children as passive
and innocent beings incapable of possessing criminal intent.'
Progressives considered juvenile delinquency a disease in need of
specialized treatment.'6 According to Progressives, successful
treatment required addressing the child's individualized needs
regardless of the severity of his offense. 7 To accomplish this,
13. See KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 6, for discussion of juvenile justice during the
Progressive Era.
14. See Mack, supra note 1, at 106.
The child was arrested, put into prison, indicted by the grand jury, tried by a petit jury,
under all the forms and technicalities of our criminal law, with the aim of ascertaining
whether it had done the specific act-nothing else-and if it had, then of visiting the
punishment of the state upon it.
Id.
Prior to the creation of juvenile courts, the common law infancy defense provided the only
special protection for youths charged with crimes, creating a presumption that children less than
7 years old lacked criminal capacity. See Sanford J. Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court,
11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 659, 659-60 (1970). The defense also created a rebuttable
presumption that children between 7 and 14 years old were not responsible for their actions. Id.
at 660.
15. See PLATr, supra note 5, at 36-55; Ainsworth, supra note 6, at 1096-1101; Fox, supra
note 5, at 1189-95.
16. See Ralph A. Rossum, Holding Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America's
"Juvenile Injustice System," 22 PEPP. L. REv. 907, 909-12 (1995).
17. Id. at914.
[A] juvenile who commits murder is not to be charged with, found guilty of, or
punished for murder, rather, he is simply to be adjudicated delinquent and treated in
such a way as to cure his disease of delinquency. His murderous conduct is a symptom
of his disease of delinquency and of his need for individually-tailored treatment to cure
him of that disease. The same view applies to a juvenile who shoplifts; his misdeed
establishes him as a delinquent-no more and no less than the murderer-and shows
him to be equally in need of individualized treatment to cure his disease.
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Progressives advocated a specialized system for juvenile
delinquents"' that, contrary to standard criminal proceedings, focused
on the offender rather than the offense and emphasized rehabilitation
over punishment.' 9
In 1899, Illinois became the first state to establish a juvenile court
modeled after the Progressive vision.20 By 1945, every state and
federal jurisdiction had established a court system.2' The creators of
the juvenile courts intended for the juvenile courts to operate in a
procedurally informal manner and emphasize treatment over
punishment.22 To protect juveniles from the harmful stigma
associated with criminal trials, juvenile proceedings and records were
hidden from public view.' In addition, upon reaching majority, an
individual's juvenile record was expunged.24  Juvenile court
dispositions could take a variety of forms' because courts exercised
nearly limitless discretion over the juveniles brought before them.26
Consequently, the length of treatment and coerciveness of intervention are determined
not by what the juveniles have done, but by what the juvenile court deems necessary to
cure them of their disease of delinquency.
Id.
18. To Progressive reformers, juvenile delinquency included both criminal and non-
criminal acts. Id. at 909.
19. Ainsworth, supra note 6, at 1096-1101.
20. Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 131.
21. See Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik, Criminal Law: Prosecuting Juveniles in
Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439, 451
(1985).
22. See Ainsworth, supra note 6, at 1098.
23. See Rossum, supra note 16, at 912.
24. See Samuel M. Davis, Legal and Procedural Issues Related to the Waiver Process, in
MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING: READINGS IN PUBLIC
POLICY 227,238-39 (John C. Hall et al. ads., Academy for Contemporary Problems 1981).
25. For example, the original Illinois Act authorized juvenile courts to institutionalize
children, send children to orphanages or foster homes, or place children on probation. See
KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 6, at 30.
26. Ainsworth, supra note 6, at 1099. Indeterminate sentencing is a key tenet of the
philosophy behind the juvenile justice system. A juvenile sentenced for an indeterminate length
of time is subject to the juvenile court's jurisdiction until the court determines that the juvenile
is rehabilitated. Id. at 1099-1100. See also Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the
1997]
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Regardless of the severity of the offense that served as a basis for
juvenile court jurisdiction, however, juveniles were released once
they were rehabilitated."
Although rehabilitation was the original objective of juvenile
courts, the increasingly violent and destructive behavior associated
with juvenile delinquency over the last several decades has thwarted
the realization of this goal.2" The failure of traditional juvenile justice
systems to adequately rehabilitate violent juvenile offenders has
prompted many states to modify their juvenile codes to remove
violent juveniles from the protective jurisdiction29 of the juvenile
courts. The expansion of transfer provisions has been accompanied
Principle of Offensive: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV.
821, 847-50 (1988) (discussing indeterminate sentencing in juvenile courts).
27. Ainsworth, supra note 6, at 1100.
28. See infra Part ll.B for statistics documenting the failure of juvenile justice systems
ability to control rates of delinquency.
29. A juvenile subject only to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system is protected in a
variety of ways. First, under traditional juvenile systems, once the juvenile reaches majority,
jurisdiction of the juvenile court ceases and the juvenile is released from any future obligations
to continue his rehabilitative treatment. Second, when the juvenile reaches majority, the
juvenile's criminal records are expunged. Thus, if the juvenile goes on to commit future crimes
as an adult, he may appear to have a "clean" record and the state may decide not to prosecute
him. Even if the former juvenile offender is prosecuted and convicted, the sentencing judge may
treat him leniently as an apparent first-time offender. See generally PATRICIA TORBET ET AL.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 35-44
(1996) [hereinafter STATE RESPONSES].
30. See id. at 3-10 (summarizing modifications of state transfer mechanisms through the
1995 legislative session). Modifications of state juvenile codes have taken three general forms
to allow the transfer of juveniles to criminal courts: judicial waiver, prosecutorial discretion,
and statutory exclusion. MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, How JUVENILES GET TO
CRIMINAL COURT (1994). Judicial waiver allows juvenile court judges, at their discretion, to
transfer juveniles to criminal court. Id. In states allowing judicial waiver, judges typically base
their decision to transfer on the juvenile's age, the offense committed, the juvenile's prior
record, and the juvenile's amenability to treatment. Id. Between 1988 and 1992, waivers
increased 68% and the number of waivers doubled for all offense categories except property
offenses. Id.
States adopting prosecutorial discretion authorize prosecutors to file charges against
juveniles in either juvenile or criminal court. Id. Criminal and juvenile courts share original
jurisdiction for charges of serious, violent, or repeated crimes. Id. As of 1994, twelve states
authorized prosecutors to file certain cases in either juvenile or criminal court. NATIONAL INST.
OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE LAWS ON PROSECUTORS' AND JUDGES' USE OF
JUVENILE RECORDS (1995).
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by an erosion of the confidentiality surrounding juvenile
proceedings.3' In response to demands for public access to juvenile
proceedings, many state legislatures have enacted laws limiting
confidentiality in juvenile proceedings.32 By excluding some
delinquents from juvenile jurisdiction, recent punitive measures
achieved precisely what the Progressives sought to reform-the
treatment of juvenile offenders as adults.
The final method of transfer is statutory exclusion under which juveniles are removed from
juvenile jurisdiction if certain statutory criteria are satisfied. SICKMUND, supra, at 3. One form
of statutory exclusion adopted by legislatures is lowering the minimum age limit the juvenile
may be prosecuted as an adult. As of 1994, eleven states have set the upper age limit for
juvenile court jurisdiction under eighteen. Id. Many states that have enacted statutory exclusion
provisions also exclude certain serious offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction. Id. Serious
offenses typically excluded are murder and person offenses such as rape, assault or robbery. Id.
Some states also exclude certain drug, property, weapons, or felony offenses. Id. In addition,
several states exclude felony charges if the juvenile has prior felony adjudications or
convictions. Id.
31. See STATE RESPONSES, supra note 29, at 35-44 (discussing recent modifications of
confidentiality provisions by states).
32. See id at 37-38 fig. 8 (summarizing current state confidentiality provisions). For a
discussion of the constitutionality of laws that restrict press access to juvenile proceedings, see
generally Susan S. Greenebaum, Note, Conditional Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings: A
Prior Restraint or a Viable Solution?. 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 135 (1993). See
also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court. 457 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1982) (invalidating a state
statute requiring judges to exclude the press and general public from the courtroom during
testimony of the victim in trials for specified sexual offenses involving victims under the age of
eighteen); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1979) (holding that First
Amendment interests outweigh interests in juvenile anonymity when a newspaper publishes the
name of a juvenile murder suspect that it had discovered by interviewing witnesses, police, and
the prosecuting attorney unless the state could show an "interest of the highest order" that
would outweigh the interest of the unrestrained press); Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v. District Court,
430 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that a state court may not prohibit the
publication of truthful information obtained at judicial proceedings open to the public); Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (holding that a state's policy preserving the anonymity of a
juvenile offender is outweighed by a criminal defendant's right to probe into the potential bias
of a critical witness).
Other courts addressing the issue of confidentiality also indicate a willingness to deny
confidentiality under certain circumstances. In United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353 (3d Cir.
1994), the court interpreted the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act to allow district judges to
regulate access to the proceedings on a case-by-case basis by balancing the interests of the
parties. Id. at 1361. When confronted with the issue of confidentiality in News Group Boston,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 568 N.E.2d 600 (Mass. 1991), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that no fundamental right exists to exclude the public from juvenile proceedings. Id.
at 603.
1997]
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B. Federal Juvenile Justice Policy
Until the 1970s, the federal government played a relatively minor
role in shaping juvenile justice policy on the state level.3 Statutes
enacted by Congress to facilitate the prosecution of juveniles in
federal court, such as the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938
(FJDA)34 and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994 (VCCLEA),35 apply to only a small number of juveniles that
fall within the narrow jurisdiction created by the particular statute.36
The remaining (and overwhelming majority) of juvenile offenders are
tried in state courts. Thus, in order to effectuate meaningful changes
in juvenile justice, federal legislation must operate at the state level.
1. The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
In 1938 Congress enacted the FJDA to provide federal courts with
jurisdiction over certain juvenile delinquency proceedings.37 The
FJDA granted the Attorney General38 unlimited discretion in deciding
33. In 1974, Congress enacted the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
(JJDPA) to encourage reform in state juvenile systems. Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109
(1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). See infra Part
I.B.3 for further discussion of the JJDPA.
34. Pub. L. No. 75-666, §§ 1-9, 52 Stat. 764, 764-66 (1938) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1994)).
35. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
See infra Part I.B.4 for further discussion of the VCCLEA.
36. See 141 CoNG. REC. S13,656-59 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1995) (remarks by Sen. Ashcroft)
(stating that 197 juveniles were tried in federal proceedings in 1990; 166 in 1991; 109 in 1992;
64 in 1993; and 92 in 1994). Because so few juveniles are tried in the federal justice system,
federal laws broadening the number of offenses for which a juvenile can be tried as an adult are
of limited deterrence value.
37. Pub. L. No. 75-666, § 2,52 stat. 764,765 (1938) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
5031 (1994)).
38. See Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding that Congress
could legitimately grant the Attorney General discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a
juvenile as an adult and that the exercise of such discretion does not require a due process
hearing). See also United States ex rel. Bombarino v. Bensinger, 498 F.2d 875, 877 n.7 (7th Cir.
1974) (quoting People v. Jiles, 251 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1969) (noting that "[w]hile it may be
highly desirable to commit to the judge of a specialized juvenile court the determination of
[Vol. 51:331
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whether to offer prosecution as a juvenile to any defendant under the
age of eighteen not surrendered to state officials or charged with
offenses punishable by life imprisonment or death.39
The FJDA remained virtually unchanged until Congress enacted
the Juvenile Justice and Delinqency Prevention Act of 1974
(JJDPA).40 The JJDPA amended the FJDA by: (1) changing the
definition of a juvenile, (2) requiring judicial approval before
prosecuting a juvenile as an adult, (3) restricting the number of
offenses for which a juvenile could be tried as an adult, and (4)
providing for federal prosecution of juveniles when no state would
exercise jurisdiction over the offender.4' In response to the growing
number of juveniles committing serious offenses, however, Congress
further amended the FJDA by enacting the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984.42 The 1984 Act expanded the federal role in
juvenile justice by authorizing the prosecution of juveniles as adults
for additional offenses and mandating adult trial of juveniles in
certain cases.43
As amended, the FJDA specifies three situations in which a
federal prosecutor may invoke jurisdiction over a juvenile offender:
(1) if a state lacks, or refuses to assert, jurisdiction over a particular
juvenile offender;'M (2) if the state's programs do not adequately meet
the needs of the juvenile;45 or (3) if there is a substantial federal
interest in prosecuting the particular defendant.46 Once a prosecutor
whether or not a particular juvenile is to be prosecuted criminally, we are aware of no
constitutional requirement that a State must do so").
39. Pub. L. No. 75-666, § 2, 52 Stat. 764, 765 (1938) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
5031 (1994).
40. See infra Part I.B.3 for discussion of the JJDPA.
41. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5032 (1994).
42. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. I1, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 5032.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. This exception applies most frequently when juveniles are charged with
1997]
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establishes federal jurisdiction over the juvenile offender, the FJDA
provides three routes by which juveniles may stand trial as adults.
First, a juvenile may consent to stand trial as an adult.47 Second, if a
juvenile is charged with committing a violent felony or certain drug
offenses and is over a certain age, the Attorney General may request
criminal jurisdiction.48 In such a case, a federal judge must conduct a
hearing to determine whether criminal prosecution is in the interest of
justice by balancing the severity of the alleged offense against the
juvenile's amenability to rehabilitative treatment.49 Finally, if the
committing violent felonies and certain drug or firearms offenses that are federal crimes. Id. See
United States v. Male Juvenile, 844 F. Supp. 280,285 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding that an ordinary
bank robbery does not involve a "substantial Federal interest" even when a weapon is used).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Paragraph four of§ 5032 states: "A juvenile who is alleged to have
committed an act ofjuvenile delinquency and who is not surrendered to State authorities shall
be proceeded against under this chapter unless he has requested in writing upon advice of
counsel to be proceeded against as an adult... ." Id.
A juvenile may desire criminal prosecution because he may believe that the procedural
rights afforded to criminal defendants would aid in his defense. For example, in juvenile
proceedings, ajury is not a constitutional requirement. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971). Thus, a juvenile who believes that a jury will view his defense favorably may
wisely consent to criminal prosecution.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Paragraph four of§ 5032 further provides:
[W]ith respect to a juvenile fifteen years and older alleged to have committed an act
after his fifteenth birthday which if committed by an adult would be a felony that is a
crime of violence of an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances
Act (21 U.S.C. 841), or section 1002(a), 1005, or 1009 of the Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a), 955, 959), or section 922(x) of this title, or
in section 924(b), (g), or (h) of this title, criminal prosecution on the basis of the
alleged act may be begun by motion to transfer of the Attorney General in the
appropriate district court of the United States, if such court finds, after hearing, such
transfer would be in the interest ofjustice. In the application of the preceding sentence,
if the crime of violence is an offense under section 113(a), 113(b), 113(c), 1111, 1113,
or, if the juvenile possessed a firearm during the offense, section 2111, 2113, 2241(a),
or 2241(c), "thirteen" shall be substituted for "fifteen" and "thirteenth" shall be
substituted for "fifteenth".
Id
49. 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Paragraph five of§ 5032 states:
Evidence of the following factors shall be considered, and findings with regard to
each factor shall be made in the record, in assessing whether a transfer would be in the
interest of justice: the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the
alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the
[Vol. 51:331
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prosecutor invokes a mandatory transfer provision and the juvenile
offender is sixteen years of age or older and charged with certain
serious offenses, then criminal jurisdiction can be established."
2. Constitutional Protections Extended to Juvenile Court
Proceedings
As juvenile court dispositions began to increasingly resemble
sentences handed down by criminal courts, juveniles claimed that the
informal and non-adversarial procedures characteristic of juvenile
proceedings violated their constitutional right to due process. In 1966
the Supreme Court validated this argument in Kent v. United States5'
by holding that juveniles are constitutionally entitled to due process
and representation by counsel. 2 The following year the Court
extended due process protections to juvenile proceedings in In re
juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of
past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; the availability of
programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.
Id.
50. Mandatory transfer provisions for certain violent felonies or serious drug violations
were added by Congress in the 1984 amendments to the FJDA. Id. Paragraph four provides
further:
[A] juvenile who is alleged to have committed an act after his sixteenth birthday which
if committed by an adult would be a felony offense that has an element thereof the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or that,
by its very nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person of
another may be used in committing the offense, or would be an offense described in
section 32, 81, 844(d), (e), (f), (hi), (i) or 2275 of this title, subsection (b)(1)(A), (B), or
(C), (d), or (e) of subsection 401 of the Controlled Substances Act, or section 1002(a),
1003, 1009, or 1010(bX1), (2), or (3) of the Controlled Substances Import and Export
Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a), 953, 959, 960(b)(1), (2), (3)), and who has previously been
found guilty of an act which if committed by an adult would have been one of the
offenses set forth in this paragraph or an offense in violation of a State felony statute
that would have been such an offense if a circumstance giving rise to Federal
jurisdiction had existed, shall be transferred to the appropriate district court of the
United States for criminal prosecution.
Id.
51. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
52. Id. at 561-63.
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Gault.3 In that case, the Court provided juveniles with a right to
notice of charges made against them,54 a right to counsel, 5 a right to
the privilege against self-incrimination,56 and a right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses.5 7 In 1970 the Court continued to expand the
constitutional protection for juveniles in In re Winship,58 holding that
juvenile courts must apply the reasonable doubt standard in juvenile
delinquency proceedings. 9 Five years later, in Breed v. Jones,60 the
Court held that the double jeopardy protections provided by the Fifth
Amendment also apply to juveniles tried in juvenile court.6 ' The only
constitutional protection that the Court expressly denied to juveniles
was the unqualified right to ajury trial.62
3. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974
Congress enacted the JJDPA63 to prevent delinquency and divert
53. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
54. Id. at 33.
55. Id. at41.
56. Id. at 55.
57. Id. at 56-57.
58. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
59. Id. at368.
60. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
61. Id. at541.
62. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971). In denying the right to a jury
trial in juvenile delinquency proceedings, the McKeiver Court noted that despite the failure of
juvenile courts to rehabilitate juveniles, the introduction of a jury trial would defeat the
rehabilitative goal by turning the proceeding into an adversarial process. Id. at 545. The Court
noted that "[t]here is a possibility, at least, that the jury trial, if required as a matter of
constitutional precept, will remake juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will
put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective
proceeding." Id.
Although refusing to mandate jury trials for juvenile proceedings, the McKeiver Court
noted that nothing prevented states from installing jury systems in their own juvenile court
systems. Id. See Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., The Right to a Public Jury Tial: A Need for Today's
Juvenile Court, 76 JUDICATURE 230, 233 (1993) (noting that eleven states have instituted jury
trials for juveniles).
63. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat.
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juveniles from the traditional juvenile justice system by providing
states with an incentive to reform their juvenile codes.6' To effectuate
these policies, Congress conditioned the receipt of federal funds on
compliance with three substantive requirements.65 First, states could
no longer place juveniles charged with status offenses' in secure
correctional facilities or secure detention.67 Second, states could no
longer confine juveniles alleged or found to be delinquent in facilities
where they would have regular contact with incarcerated adults. 8
Third, Congress required states to establish an adequate system of
monitoring detention and correctional facilities to ensure that the
1109 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-39 (1994)). The JJDPA created the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) as the official federal agency for
financing and administering juvenile delinquency program. Id. § 5611. The JJDPA charges the
Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice with making recommendations to the Attorney
General and President regarding the coordination of overall federal policy. Id. § 5616. For
discussion of the JJDPA amendments of the FJDA, see supra Part I.B.1.
64. Id. § 5602(b). The Act provides:
[It is the] declared policy of Congress to provide the necessary resources,
leadership, and coordination (1) to develop and implement effective methods of
preventing and reducing juvenile delinquency...; (2) to develop and conduct effective
programs to prevent delinquency, to divert juveniles from the traditional juvenile
justice system and to provide critically needed alternatives to institutionalization; (3) to
improve the quality of juvenile justice in the United States; (4) to increase the capacity
of State and local governments and public and private agencies to conduct effective
juvenile justice and delinquency prevention and rehabilitation programs and to provide
research, evaluation, and training services in the field of juvenile delinquency
prevention; (5) to encourage parental involvement in treatment and alternative
disposition programs; and (6) to provide for beter coordination between State, local,
and community-based agencies and to promote interagency cooperation in providing
such services.
Id.
65. The Supreme Court has approved Congress' conditioning of federal funding to
encourage states to adopt certain regulations. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212
(1987) (upholding a federal law conditioning state eligibility for federal highway funds on the
state setting its minimum drinking age at 21-years-old as a valid exercise of Congress' spending
power).
66. A status offense is an offense which, if committed by an adult, would not be a crime.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(aXl2XA).
68. Id. § 5633(aX13).
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state would place no juveniles in contact with incarcerated adults. 9 A
state failing to submit a plan" that complies with the JJDPA
requirements forfeits a percentage of its federal funding.7
4. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
Congress enacted the VCCLEA72 to address serious juvenile and
gang violence. The VCCLEA authorizes the criminal prosecution of
juveniles as young as thirteen years of age for certain serious felonies
including first- and second-degree murder, attempted murder, and
bank robbery.73 The VCCLEA also criminalizes participation in
criminal street gangs. Membership in a criminal street gang subjects
juveniles to federal jurisdiction if they also commit certain federal
crimes.74 In determining whether to transfer a juvenile to adult status,
69. Id. § 5633(a)(14). Congress was concerned that exposure to adult criminals would
transform juvenile delinquents into hardened criminals. See 141 CONG. REC. H874 (daily ed.
Jan. 30, 1995) (statement of Rep. Martinez) ("Prior to the imposition of [the JJDPA mandate to
segregate juvenile and adult prisoners] young children ... were housed in the same facilities as
hardened adult criminals and ... subjected to abuse by those adult prisoners."); 140 CONG.
REC. S14,118 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Cohen) ("One of the primary aims of the
[JJDPA] was to segregate juvenile offenders from adult criminals so the youth would not be
negatively influenced by adults convicted of, or awaiting trial on serious criminal charges.").
70. The requirements for state plans are listed at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a).
71. 42 U.S.C § 5633(c)(3). Under the current version of the JJDPA, if a state fails to
comply with the requirements of § 5633(a)(12)(A), (13), (14), or (23) its funding may be
reduced by 25% for each such noncompliance. Id. Subsections (a)(12)(A), (13), and (14) of
§ 5633 prohibit the mingling ofjuveniles with incarcerated adults. Subsection (a)(23) of § 5633
seeks "to reduce the proportion ofjuveniles detained or confined in secure detention facilities,
secure correctional facilities, jails, and lockups who are members of minority groups if such
proportion exceeds the proportion such groups represent in the general population."
72. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-323, 108
Stat. 1796 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
73. § 140001, 108 Stat. at 2031 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 5032). See supra note 48 (quoting
applicable portion of§ 5032).
74. These crimes include:
(1) a Federal felony involving a controlled substance ... for which the maximum
penalty is not less than 5 years;
(2) a Federal felony crime of violence that has as an element the use or attempted
use of physical force against the person of another, and
(3) a conspiracy to commit an offense described in paragraph (1) or (2).
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federal judges may consider the role a juvenile played in a criminal
street gang." In addition, the VCCLEA amends the FJDA to
authorize federal courts to release information relating to the
adjudication to the Federal Bureau of Investigation if a juvenile
thirteen years of age or older is convicted of certain crimes of
violence.76
II. PUNISHING VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS
Because of the perceived escalation of violent juvenile crime,
some states have shifted the focus of their juvenile justice systems
from rehabilitation to punishment." States justify this shift on one or
18 U.S.C. § 521(c) (1994). The statute defines "criminal street gang" as an ongoing association
of at least five persons that has a primary purpose of committing one or more of the criminal
offenses listed at 18 U.S.C § 521(c). Id.
The Commerce Clause is the basis for federal jurisdiction over juveniles accused of
participating in a criminal street gang. See 18 U.S.C. § 521(a)(C). As a result of the Supreme
Court's recent restriction of the scope of the Commerce Clause, courts may be reluctant to find
that the activities of gangs affect interstate or foreign commerce. See United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that the Gun-free School Zones Act, which made it a federal
offense to knowingly possess a gun in a school zone, did not affect interstate commerce). Cf.
United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 549-50 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the federal carjacking
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, as a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause).
75. § 150002, 108 Stat. at 2035 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 5032).
In considering the nature of the offense.., the court shall consider the extent to
which the juvenile played a leadership role in an organization, or otherwise influenced
other persons to take part in criminal activities, involving the use or distribution of
controlled substances or firearms. Such a factor, if found to exist, shall weigh in favor
of a transfer to adult status, but the absence of this factor shall not preclude such a
transfer.
Id
76. § 140005, 108 Stat. at 2032 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 5038(f)). The information which
may be released by the court includes: name, offense, and sentence. Id. Before Congress
enacted the VCCLEA, a juvenile's records would also be transmitted to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation only if on two separate occasions the juvenile had been convicted of a crime
which, if committed by an adult, would be a felony crime of violence or an offense under
statutes prohibiting drug manufacture and importation. 18 U.S.C. § 5038(f).
77. See infra notes 99 and 105 for states that have amended the purpose of their juvenile
justice systems to emphasize punishment over rehabilitation. See also STATES RESPONSES,
supra note 29, 17-24.
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more of the following theories: (1) punishment will deter future
juvenile offenders, (2) punishment will incapacitate juvenile
offenders and prevent them from committing future offenses, and (3)
punishment satisfies society's desire for accountability and
retribution.7" Part A presents the arguments supporting punishment of
juvenile offenders. Part B then challenges age-based exclusions
found in state juvenile codes which immunize most juveniles under a
certain age from criminal prosecution.
A. Philosophical Arguments for Punishment
The goal of juvenile justice systems has traditionally centered on
rehabilitating juvenile offenders.79 However, many states now openly
advocate punishment of juvenile offenders who commit serious
crimes.8" Supporters of punishment-based juvenile justice systems
maintain that because traditional juvenile justice systems have not
achieved meaningful results through rehabilitation, punishment might
deter or incapacitate violent juveniles and, at a minimum, satiate the
public's desire for retribution.8 '
78. See infra Part lI.A.4.
79. See Francis B. McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case
for Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 629, 641 (1994)
("An integral part of the philosophy of the juvenile court was that children were not fully
responsible for their acts and consequently should be shielded from the punishment that would
be exacted from a responsible actor."). See also supra Part I.A.
80. See infra notes 99 and 105. See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Day, Comment, Juvenile Justice in
Washington: A Punitive System in Need of Rehabilitation, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 399
(1992) (discussing the state of Washington's abandonment of the rehabilitation model of
juvenile justice in favor of a punishment-based model).
81. See R Daniel O'Connor, Note, Defining the Strike Zone-An Analysis of the
Classification ofPrior Convictions Under the Federal "Three-Strikes and You're Out" Scheme,
36 B.C. L. REV. 847, 848 (1995). For a discussion of the effectiveness of selective
incapacitation and objections to the use of selective incapacitation in sentencing policy, see
Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 511 (1982) [hereinafter Selective Incapacitation].
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1. Rehabilitation
According to rehabilitationists, punishment should be designed to
alter the offender's behavior so that the offender will be less inclined
to engage in unlawful conduct in the future. Punishment for other
purposes is to be avoided. 2 Rehabilitationists view juveniles as
products of their environments who are in need of special treatment
designed to help them respond productively to negative external
influences.8 3 Proponents of rehabilitation in the juvenile justice
system claim that modification of a juvenile's improper conduct can
occur only through altering the juvenile's thinking, goals, and
values. 4 By providing a nuturing environment for juvenile offenders,
rehabilitationists believe that the former offenders will develop new,
positive self-images which will, in turn, result in lower juvenile crime
rates.85
82. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 170 (1948) ("[A]II punishment in itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it
ought to at all be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some
greater evil."). But see H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 25-27 (1968). In
disparaging the suggestion that rehabilitation should serve as the objective of criminal law, Hart
states:
Reform can only have a place within a system of punishment as an exploitation of the
opportunities presented by the conviction or compulsory detention of offenders....
There is indeed a paradox in asserting that Reform should "predominate" in a
system of Criminal Law, as if the main purpose of providing punishment for murder
was to reform the murderer not to prevent murder .... Society is divisible at any
moment into two classes (i) those who have actually broken a given law and (ii) those
who have not yet broken it but may. To take Reform as the dominant objective would
be to forgo the hope of influencing the second and-in relation to the more serious
offences-numerically much greater class. We should thus subordinate the prevention
of first offences to the prevention of recidivism.
Id. at 26-27.
83. Julianne P. Sheffer, Note, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes:
Reconciling Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 479,482 (1995).
84. See Anne R. Mahoney, "Man, I'm Already Dead": Serious Juvenile Offenders in
Context, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 443,454 (1991).
85. Cf id.
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2. Deterrence
In theory, deterrence accomplishes at least two interrelated
objectives. First, punishment conditions the offender to refrain from
taking future action, such as committing additional crimes, that will
lead to additional punishment.86 Second, by punishing the offender,
individuals contemplating criminal conduct may refrain from
engaging in similar conduct to avoid similar punishment." The
success of deterrence depends on the ability of present and future
offenders to comprehend the risks associated with engaging in the
proscribed conduct.88 Additionally, the effectiveness of deterrence is
critically linked to swift and predictable punishment.89 For many
juvenile offenders, however, punishment is rarely both swift and
predictable.9"
86. Deterrence of a person who has already violated the law is known as specific
deterrence. Rebecca Dresser, Personal Identity and Punishment, 70 B.U. L. REV. 395, 435
(1990). See Frank G. Carrington, Deterrence, Death, and the Victims of Crime. A Common
Sense Approach, 35 VAND. L. REV. 587, 588 (1982) ("Deterrence does not act as a direct
restraint on conduct; rather it works to manipulate the motives or incentives behind that
conduct.').
87. Punishment of an offender for the purpose of conditioning other persons from
engaging in unlawful conduct is termed general deterrence. Dresser, supra note 86, at 435.
Utilitarians argue that because the offender will view punishment as undesirable, he will not
engage in conduct subjecting him to future punishment to ensure that he maximizes his
happiness. See ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 113 (1991).
88. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 87, at 113. The author notes:
Prospective offenders need be no more rational than rats are when taught by means of
rewards or punishments to run a maze. Experimenters must calculate the effects they
desire and the means appropriate to achieve them. So must legislators. But the rats do
not calculate, nor do the subjects of legislation need to.
Id. See also Carrington, supra note 86, at 589 ("Irrespective of [a potential criminal's]
intellectual capacity to understand a concept, human beings are capable of responding to
threats, learning from experience, and forming habits.").
89. See RALPH ELLIS & CAROL ELLIS, THEORIES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19 (1989).
90. See Jeffery A. Butts, Speedy Trial in the Juvenile Court, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 515
(1996) (noting the recent increase in the length ofjuvenile court dispositions in recent years).
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3. Incapacitation
Incapacitation theorists suggest that incarcerating violent and
repeat offenders for long periods of time will reduce the overall level
of crime.91 Because offense rates for violent crime generally peak
around the age of seventeen and decline substantially over the next
ten years, incarceration of violent juvenile offenders during the peak
of their offending years would remove these juveniles from
communities when they are most likely to commit violent crimes.92
Another advantage of incapacitating violent juvenile offenders is that
juvenile justice professionals could concentrate their resources on
juveniles more amenable to rehabilitation.
Implementing a system of punishment based on principles of
incapacitation forces judges to predict an offender's future behavior.
Judges must attempt to predict whether a particular offender, based
on the offender's prior record, will commit future crimes if not
incarcerated. 93 The success of incapacitation therefore depends not
only on apprehending and sentencing offenders but also on accurately
predicting which delinquents will reoffend at relatively early stages
91. See John Blackmore & Jane Welsh, Selective Incapacitation: Sentencing According to
Risk, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 504 (1983). Selective incapacitation seeks to identify "high risk"
offenders and impose "long, 'incapacitating' prison sentences." Id. See also Selective
Incapacitation, supra note 81, at 511 ("Selective incapacitation theory asserts that the effect of
imprisonment on street crime is a direct function of the rate at which incarcerated offenders
would have committed crimes if they were not confined."); James E. Hooper, Note, Bright
Lines. Dark Deeds: Counting Convictions Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 89 MICH. L.
REv. 1951, 1953 (1991) (defining "selective incapacitation" as a method of weeding out the
groups most likely to commit crimes and least amenable to rehabilitation).
92. See I CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS" 23 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds.,
1986); ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY YOUNG PEOPLE: WHY THE
DEADLY NExUS? 3 (1995); see also MICHAEL R GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A
GENERAL THEORY ON CRIME 253 (1990); Daniel S. Nagin & David P. Farrington, The Onset
and Persistence of Offending, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 501 (1992). The relationship between age and
crime rates is commonly referred to as the "age-crime curve." BLUMENSTEIN, supra, at 3. To
the extent that the age-crime curve accurately forecasts criminal behavior, sentencing violent
juvenile offenders to prison terms reaching beyond the at-risk ages for violent crime (the late-
twenties for most offenses) will reduce violent crime.
93. JACQUELINE COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INCAPACITATING CRIMINALS: RECENT
RESEARCH FINDINGS (1983).
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in their criminal careers.'
4. Retribution
While deterrence and incapacitation are theories based on the
principle that punishing offenders will reduce future crime,"
retributionists maintain that individuals who commit crimes deserve
punishment in proportion with their moral culpability." For
retributionists, punishment is not related to deterring future crimes or
rehabilitating the offender;97 rather, the sole reason for punishing
offenders is because they "deserve it.""8 Although retribution often
serves as a justification for punishing adult offenders, legislatures and
courts rarely consider retribution an appropriate goal of juvenile
justice systems."
94. Id. Opponents of incapacitation argue that two persons who commit the same offense
deserve equal punishment. Id. Moreover, unequal punishment is viewed as unfairly punishing
people for crimes they may never commit solely because a judge believes they will re-offend.
Id.
95. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
96. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie, B.D. trans. 1887)
("[P]unishment ... must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is
inflicted has committed a Crime."); MICHAEL S. MOORE, THE MORAL WORTH OF
RETRIBUTION, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 685 (Joel Fineberg & Hyman Gross eds., Wadsworth,
4th ed. 1991); C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT46-48 (1987).
97. See KANT, supra note 96, at 195. Kant states:
Juridical Punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting
another Good either with regard to the Criminal himself or to Civil Society.... [W]oe
to him who creeps through the serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some
advantage that may discharge him from the Justice of Punishment, or even the due
measure of it ....
Id.
98. TEN, supra note 96, at 46-48.
99. Washington state is an example of a state with a retributionist goal for its juvenile
justice system. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (West 1993) ("It is the... intent of
the legislature that youth ... be held accountable for their offenses and that both communities
and the juvenile courts carry out their functions consistent with this intent.'). But cf. United
States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 315 (1992) (O'Connor dissenting) ("[T]he focus of sentencing
[in juvenile proceedings] is on treatment, not punishment. The presumption is that juveniles are
still teachable and not yet 'hardened criminals."').
[Vol. 51:331
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol51/iss1/6
FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
B. Criminal Culpability of Juveniles
In every state, the jurisdiction of juvenile courts is reserved for
offenders falling below a legislatively prescribed age."°0 Although
juveniles at or below the jurisdictional age limit may be transferred to
criminal court,'' no offender over the age limit may be tried in
juvenile court. A certain degree of arbitrariness necessarily exists
when drawing lines for the purpose of imposing adult criminal
sanctions.' Often, age-based classifications are more a desire for
administrative convenience than a determination of criminal capacity.
Assuming that an individual understands the nature and quality of his
actions, punishing all offenders equally regardless of age is less
arbitrary than the current blanket immunization of many younger
juveniles from criminal liability. Imposing adult penalties on juvenile
offenders is also not inherently unfair. Several studies indicate that
children under eighteen are capable of mature decisionmaking and
suggest that fixing the threshold for criminal liability for juveniles at
the age of fourteen or lower would not subject juveniles to criminal
sanctions without culpability.' 3
100. As of 1994, age 17 was the oldest age permitted for original juvenile court jurisdiction
in delinquency matters in 39 states and the District of Columbia. SICKMUND, supra note 30, at 4
tbl. 4.
101. Seesupranote30.
102. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
103. One study indicates that children as young as 10 years old are "as competent at
decision-making as adults." LAURENCE HOULGATE, THE CHILD AND THE STATE: A
NORMATIVE THEORY OF JUVENILE RIGHTS 61-73 (1980). Another study concludes that by age
fourteen, "the average child has reached the equivalent level of moral reasoning possessed by
most adults." Lawrence Kohlberg, The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a
Moral Order, 6 VITA HUMANA 11, 16 (1963). See also Barry C. Feld, The Decision to Seek
Criminal Charges: Just Desserts and the Waiver Decision, 3 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 27, 37 (1984)
("Psychological research concemaing legal socialization, internalization of social and legal
expectations, and ethical decision making... indicates that by about age fourteen a youth has
acquired most of the legal and moral values that will guide his behavior through later life."). Id.
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III. STATE RESPONSES TO VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS
A. Punishment Adopted as a Goal
In response to the decline in public support for traditional juvenile
justice systems,"° several state legislatures have amended their
juvenile codes to include the punishment of juvenile offenders and
protection of society as official purposes of their states' juvenile
justice systems.'0 5 Some states have even made punishment the
primary goal of the juvenile justice system. 106
Juvenile courts were neither designed nor intended to handle
violent juvenile offenders. 7 The remedial authority of juvenile
courts is of limited value when confronted with growing numbers of
104. Polling data confirms the public's apathy towards the traditional juvenile justice
system. In one national adult survey, when interviewees were asked whether they believed that
programs emphasizing rehabilitation and protection of juveniles who commit the same crimes
as adults have been successful in controlling juvenile crime, 23% of the respondents answered
"not successful at all," 49% answered "not very successful," 24% answered "moderately
successful," and 1% answered "very successful." Gallop/CNN/USA Today telephone poll
conducted Sept. 6-7, 1994 (sample size 1,022 national adult), available in WESTLAW, Poll
database.
In another survey, interviewees were asked whether they believed that juveniles who
commit violent crimes should be treated the same as adults or whether they should be treated
more leniently. Sixty-one percent of respondents believed that juveniles who commit violent
crimes should be treated the same as adults and 13% responded that they should receive more
lenient treatment. L.A. Times telephone poll conducted Jan. 15-19, 1994 (sample size 1,516,
national adult), available in WESTLAW, Poll database.
105. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp. 1996) ("provide for the
protection and safety of the public"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-1 (1985) ("render appropriate
punishment to offenders"); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 1983) ("In any [juvenile
delinquency] proceeding . . . the court shall consider the needs and best interests of the
respondent as well as the need for protection of the community.").
106. See supra notes 99 and 105; see also Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy:
A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1072 n.467 (1995)
(quoting In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), a case in which the court
partially justified its decision to transfer a juvenile to criminal court on the language of the
state's amended purpose clause).
107. See supra Part L.A for a discussion of the mission of the juvenile courts. See also
McCarthy, supra note 79, at 641 (noting that recent legislature attempts to remove violent
juvenile offenders from the juvenile court may help focus the court on its original rehabilitative
mission).
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seriously depraved juveniles committing increasing numbers of
violent crimes.' °8 In response to the public outcry against juvenile
courts granting violent juvenile offenders light sentences, many state
legislatures have enacted measures specifically authorizing
punishment of violent juvenile offenders.'" State legislatures have
also enacted measures that enhance the opportunities to transfer
violent juveniles to criminal courts."' But despite these efforts to
combat violent juvenile crime, significant reductions in juvenile
crime have not occurred."' Additionally, present state policies have
not significantly deterred young offenders from committing crimes"'
108 See infra Part IIH.B. See, e.g., Tim Bryant, Third Killer Convicted in Murder of
Waitress, ST. Louis PoST-DISPATCH, Oct. 27, 1995, at A16. On October 10, 1993, Katie
Aulbur, a twenty-three year old St. Louisan, was abducted near her apartment on her way home
from work. Id. A thirteen-year-old juvenile, one of three assailants, pointed a sawed-off shotgun
at her, robbed her, and forced her into the trunk of her car. Id. When Aulbur forced her way out
of the trunk, she was removed from the car and the juvenile clubbed her on the head with his
shotgun. Id. When this failed to kill her, the juvenile ran her over and dumped her body in a
ravine. Id. Two years later, the juvenile, now fifteen, pleaded guilty under the juvenile code to
second-degree murder and will be released from custody when he turns eighteen. Id. At the time
of the murder, Missouri law forbade trying a juvenile under 14 as an adult. Id.
In Chicago two juveniles, ages 10 and 11, lured a 5-year-old boy into an abandoned
apartment complex. See Debbie Howlett, Chicago Tot's Young Killers Test System, USA
TODAY, Nov. 28, 1995, at A3. The juveniles then attacked the boy and dangled him out of a
14th-floor apartment window before dropping him to his death. Id. The juveniles claimed they
did this because the boy had gotten them in trouble and refused to steal candy for them. Id.
109. See Sheffer, supra note 83, at 489-510 for a comparison of serious juvenile offender
statutes that are aimed at providing greater punishment for juveniles and those that are
attempting to accomplish both punishment and rehabilitation. See also STATE RESPONSES,
supra note 29, 17-24.
110. See supra note 30 and accompanying text for discussion of these transfer mechanisms.
Some states also incorporate presumption-burden-shifting into their judicial waiver
statutes. If the prosecution has alleged certain enumerated offenses, transfer is presumed unless
the offender affirmatively establishes his or her amenability within the juvenile justice system.
See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b) and (c) (West 1984 & Supp. 1996). See also
STATE RESPONSES, supra note 29, at 5, 6 figs. 3, 4 (presenting figures of transfer options
available in each state).
111. See infra Part lI.B.
112. Id. See, e.g., Eric L. Jensen and Linda K. Metsger, A Test of the Deterrent Effect of
Legislative Waiver on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 CRiME & DELINQ. 96, 100-102 (1994)
(concluding that the Idaho legislative waiver law did not have a deterrent effect on violent
juvenile crime).
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or rehabilitated juveniles convicted or detained for serious violent
offenses." 3
B. Increase in Violent Juvenile Crime
In 1994, juvenile courts across the United States handled an
estimated 1,555,200 delinquency cases," 4 an increase of 41% over
the 1985 caseload."5 The most disturbing trend is the increase in the
number of serious violent crimes committed by juveniles." 6 For
113. See MARC LE BLANC & MARCEL FRECHETTE, MALE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY FROM
CHILDHOOD THROUGH YOUTH 83-84 (1989) (estimating that as many as 60% of adolescents
who were arrested or convicted will have criminal records as adults); TED PALMER, A PROFILE
OF CORRECTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 47-48 (1994)
(concluding that there are no particular rehabilitative programs that can produce a large
reduction in recidivism).
114. DELINQUENCY CASES 1994, supra note 7, at 1. A delinquency offense is an act "if
committed by an adult could result in criminal prosecution." JEFFREY A. BUrrs, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, OFFENDERS IN JUVENILE COURT, 1993 2 (1996) [hereinafter JUVENILE OFFENDERS
1993]. Delinquency offenses are classified as either person, property, drug, or public order
offenses. Id at 2 tbl. 1. The national delinquency case rate increased 11% between 1990 and
1994, from 50.7 to 56.1 cases disposed per 1,000 youth at risk. JEFFREY A. BUrrS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, PERSON OFFENSES IN JUVENILE COURT, 1985-1994 (Fact Sheet No. 48) (1996)
[hereinafter PERSON OFFENSES 1994].
115. PERSON OFFENSES 1994, supra note 114, at 2. "Property offenses" include burglary,
larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, arson, vandalism, trespassing, and stolen property offenses.
DELINQUENCY CASES 1994, supra note 7, at 1 tbl. 1. In 1994, 803,400 delinquency cases were
filed for property offenses. Id. This marked an increase of 22% between 1985 and 1994 and a
7% increase between 1990 and 1994. Id.
"Person offenses" include criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
simple assault, and sex offenses. Id. In 1994, 336,100 delinquency cases were filed for person
offenses. Id This represents a 6% increase between 1993 and 1994, a 38% increase between
1990 and 1994, and a 93% increase between 1985 and 1994. Id.
"Public order" offenses include obstruction of justice, disorderly conduct, weapons
offenses, liquor law violations, and nonviolent sex offenses. Id. In 1994, 295,600 cases
involving public order offenses were filed. Id. tbl. 1. This marks a 9% increase from 1993, and a
27% increase from 1990. Id. In 1994, 120,200 cases involved drug violations. Id. This
represents an increase of 35% over 1993 and a 69% increase from 1990. Id.
Sixty-one percent of the delinquency cases processed in 1994 involved juveniles under the
age of 16. Id at 2. Additionally, juveniles age 16 and under accounted for 64% of person
offense cases, 64% of property offense cases, and 42% of the drug offense cases. Id.
116. Between 1983 and 1992, juveniles accounted for 25% of the increase in murders,
forcible rapes, and robberies. HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ARE JUVENILE'S
DRIVING THE VIOLENT CRIME TRENDS? (Fact Sheet No. 16) (1994). In 1992, juveniles were
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instance, between 1988 and 1992, the number of juveniles arrested
for murder increased by 51% compared with an increase of only 9%
for adults." 7 Accompanying the surge in violent crime is a
corresponding increase in the number of weapons used in crimes by
juveniles."'
The increasing rate of violent juvenile crime has led to a greater
number of juvenile transfers to criminal court." 9 Between 1989 and
1993, transfers to criminal court increased 41% and transfers of
person offense cases increased 115%.12 Criminal court transfers,
however, represented only a small fraction of all petitioned
delinquency cases in 1989 and 1993."' In 1989, the cases most
frequently transferred to criminal court were drug offenses;'22 in
1993, person offenses were most frequently transferred.'21 However,
only a small number of petitioned person offense cases were
successfully transferred in 1993.124
arrested for over 16% of all murder and non-negligent manslaughter charges. 1996 ABSTRACT,
supra note 2, at 209 tbl. 325.
117. HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE VIOLENT CRIME ARREST
RATES 1972-1992 (Fact Sheet No. 14) (1994). Between 1988 and 1992, juvenile arrests for
forcible rape increased by 17% compared with 3% for adults. Id. Juvenile arrests for aggravated
assault increased by 49% compared with an increase of only 23% for adults. Id.
118. NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, YOUTH VIOLENCE, GUNS, AND
ILLICIT DRUG MARKETS (1995). Between 1976 and 1985, a gun was used in an average of 59%
of homicides involving juveniles ages 10 to 17. Id.
119. See supra note 30 for discussion of state transfer mechanisms.
120. JUVENILE OFFENDERS 1993, supra note 114, at 5. The actual number of delinquency
cases that involved juvenile transfer to criminal court was 11,800 in 1993 compared to 8,300
cases in 1989. Id. at 7 tbl. 11. In 1994, the number of cases transferred increased to 12,300.
DELINQUENCY CASES 1994, supra note 7, at 2. A person offense was the most serious charge in
44% of these cases. Id.
121. Transfers made up 1.5% of all delinquency cases in 1993 and 1.4% in 1989. JUVENILE
OFFENDERS 1993, supra note 114, at 7 thl. 12.
122. Id. In 1989, 2.8% of all drug cases were transferred to criminal court. Id.
123. DELINQUENCY CASES 1994, supra note 7, at 2. In 1994, 2.7% of all person offense
cases were transferred to criminal court. Id.
124. In 1993, only 5,000 person offense cases were transferred out of 181,800 cases
petitioned. JUVENILE OFFENDERS 1993, supra note 114, at 7 tbls. 10 and 11. In addition,
approximately 137,000 other person offense cases were not petitioned. Id.
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The existence of transfer provisions has failed to provide an
adequate solution to violent juvenile crime. Because of the discretion
vested in state officials, prosecutors, and judges in states with
prosecutorial discretion or judicial waiver transfer mechanisms may
simply exercise their discretion and refuse to transfer juveniles who
should otherwise be tried as adults."2 Moreover, even if a juvenile is
transferred to criminal court the juvenile may never be prosecuted for
a myriad of reasons.
IV. THE NEED FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION
While rehabilitation should remain the primary focus of juvenile
justice systems for the vast majority of juvenile offenders,'26 a small
number of chronic juvenile offenders who commit a disproportionate
share of violent crime should not escape accountability for their
actions by virtue of their age. For such juveniles,'27 incapacitation is
the only realistic option to ensure that society is adequately
protected.2 8 To deal with violent juvenile offenders, Congress should
enact legislation modeled after the Violent and Repeat Juvenile
Offender Reform Act of 1997 (VRJOA),' 29 a bill introduced in the
Senate at the beginning of the 105th Session of Congress.
125. See Rossum, supra note 16, at 922-95 (citing survey research that reveals that juvenile
justice professionals oppose efforts to limit their discretionary decisionmaking authority).
126. See United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J.,
dissenting). Judge Skelly Wright noted that:
[Tihere is no denying the fact that we cannot write these children off forever. Some
day they will grow up and at some point they will have to be freed from incarceration..
.. Mhe kind of society we have in the years to come will in no small measure depend
upon our treatment of them now.
Id.
127. The following proposal is based on defining violent crime to include murder,
attempted murder, forcible rape, aggravated assault, or robbery while armed with a dangerous
or deadly weapon.
128. Studies have shown that juveniles are less likely to re-offend after their release from
custody if they are incapacitated during their peak crime years. See supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
129. S. 10, 105th Cong. (1997).
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The VRJOA proposes to substantially modify juvenile justice at
both the state and federal levels. The VRJOA is principally designed
to bridge the gap created by ineffective state prosecution of violent
juvenile offenders and the limited federal jurisdiction over such
offenders. The VRJOA would expand federal jurisdiction over
violent juvenile offenders by amending the FJDA to permit the
criminal prosecution 3' of juveniles fourteen years of age and above
charged with certain crimes of violence 3' or serious drug offenses.'32
The VRJOA also targets gang violence'33 by creating new federal
130. Under the present version of the FDJA, the decision to criminally prosecute a juvenile
is made by the Attorney General. 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The VRJOA removes the Attorney General
from this decision and vests the United States Attorney in the appropriate jurisdiction with the
decision to prosecute a juvenile as an adult. S. 10, sec. 102(a), § 5032(a)(1). In making this
decision, the VRJOA permits the United States Attorney to consider "the prior juvenile records
of the subject juvenile, and, to the extent permitted under State law, the prior State juvenile
records of the subject juvenile." S. 10, sec. 102(a), § 5032(g)(1). The decision by the United
States Attorney is not subject to review by any court. S. 10, see. 102(a), § 5032(a)(1).
131. S. 10, sec. 102(a), § 5032(aXI)(A). The VRJOA refers to the definition of "crime of
violence" located at 18 U.S.C. § 16 which provides:
The term "crime of violence" means -
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 16.
132. S. 10, sec. 102(a), § 5032(aXIXB). The VRJOA allows for ajuvenile to be criminally
prosecuted if the juvenile is charged with a federal offense that "involves a controlled substance
•,. for which the penalty is a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years." Id. A controlled
substance is defined according to 21 U.S.C. § 802(6).
133. S. 10 §§ 201-209. The VRJOA proposes to revise the VCCLEA criminal street gang
provisions (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 521). The VRJOA defines a "criminal street gang" as:
[A]n ongoing group, club, organization, or association of 3 or more persons, whether
formal or informal-
(A) a primary activity of which is the commission of I or more predicate gang
crimes;
(B) any members of which engage, or have engaged during the 5-year period
preceding the date in question, in a pattern of criminal gang activity; and
(C) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce.
S. 10 § 203(a)(1XA). "Pattern of criminal gang activity" is defined as:
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penalties for offenses committed by gangs'34 and authorizing the
hiring of attorneys to assist in the prosecution of juvenile criminal
street gangs.' The VRJOA also allows United States Attorneys to
release the records of juvenile offenders to law enforcement
authorities and officials of schools where a juvenile offender enrolls
mhe commission of 2 or more predicate gang crimes committed in connection with,
or in furtherance of, the activities of a criminal street gang-
(A) at least 1 of which was committed after the date of enactment of the Federal
Gang Violence Act;
(B) the first of which was committed not more than 5 years before the commission
of another predicate gang crime; and
(C) that were committed on separate occasions.
Id. The term "predicate gang crime" is defined as follows:
[A]n offense, including an act of juvenile delinquency that, if committed by an
adult, would be an offense that is-
(A) a Federal offense-
(i) that is a crime of violence (as that term is defined in section 16 [of Title 18 of
the U.S.C.]) including carjacking, drive-by-shooting, shooting at an
unoccupied dwelling or motor vehicle, assault with a deadly weapon, and
homicide;
(ii) that involves a controlled substance (as that term is defined in [21 U.S.C.
§ 802] for which the penalty is imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(iii) that is a violation of section 844, section 875 or 876 (relating to extortion
and threats), section 1084 (relating to gambling), section 1955 (relating to
gambling), chapter 44 (relating to firearms), or chapter 73 (relating to
obstruction ofjustice);
(iv) that is a violation of section 1956 (relating to money laundering), insofar as
the violation of such section is related to a Federal or State offense involving
a controlled substance...;
(v) that is a violation of [8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A), 1327, or 1328](relating to
alien smuggling);
(B) a State offense involving conduct that would constitute an offense under
subparagraph (A) if Federal jurisdiction existed or had been exercised; or
(C) a conspiracy, attempt, or solicitation to commit an offense described in
subparagraph (A) or (3).
Id.
134. The bill provides that any person engaging in a pattern of criminal gang activity shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years and not more than life.
§ 203(a)(2).
135. § 209. The bill authorizes the hiring of Assistant United States Attorneys and
attorneys in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice for the purpose of prosecuting
juvenile criminal street gangs. Id.
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or seeks to enroll.'36
Under the VRJOA, juveniles prosecuted as adults in federal court
would be treated identically to adult defendants. Transferred
juveniles would be tried under the same procedures applicable to
adult defendants,'37 and federal proceedings would be open to the
general public.' When sentencing a juvenile offender, the VRJOA
allows a federal judge to consider the juvenile's entire record. 39 In
addition, federal judges may impose the death penalty on juveniles
over the age of sixteen."4 Once a juvenile is tried as an adult and
136. S. 10, see. 102(a), § 5032(gX3).
The United States Attorney may release such Federal records, and, to the extent
permitted by State law, such State records, to law enforcement authorities of any
jurisdiction and to officials of any school, school district, or postsecondary school at
which the individual who is the subject of the juvenile record is enrolled or seeks,
intends, or is instructed to enroll, if such school officials are held liable to the same
standards and penalties to which law enforcement and juvenile justice system
employees are held liable under Federal and State law, for the handling and disclosure
of such information.
d.
137. S. 10, sec. 102(a), § 5032(e). When a juvenile is tried as an adult in federal court, the
case "shall proceed in the same manner as is required by this title and by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure in proceedings against an adult." Id.
138. . 10, see. 102(a), § 5032(f)(1).
Any offense tried in a district court of the United States pursuant to this section
shall be open to the general public, in accordance with rules 10, 26, 3 1(a), and 53 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, unless good cause is established by the
moving party or is otherwise found by the court, for closure.
Id. The VRJOA mandates that a defendant's status as a juvenile, by itself, does not constitute
good cause for closure. S. 10, sec. 102(a), § 5032(0(2).
139. S. 10, sec. 102(a), § 5032 (gX2 ).
[Tihe district court responsible for imposing sentence shall have complete access
to the prior juvenile records of the subject juvenile, and, to the extent permitted under
State law, the prior State juvenile records of the subject juvenile. At sentencing, the
district court shall consider the entire available juvenile record of the subject juvenile.
Id.
140. S. 10, sec. 102(a), § 5032(d); § 103. Currently, the defendants less than 18 years of
age at the time of the offense are not eligible for the death penalty. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b).
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sentenced by a federal judge, the VRJOA removes the possibility that
a juvenile offender may be released from incarceration solely by
reaching the age of eighteen.'
The VRJOA would also encourage states to adopt reforms in their
juvenile justice systems by providing incentive grants to states that
authorize the prosecution of violent juvenile offenders as adults.'42 To
qualify for federal funding under the VRJOA, a state must make
reasonable efforts to: (1) allow for the prosecution of juveniles age
fourteen and older as adults if they commit certain offenses; (2)
provide for graduated sanctions for juvenile offenders; (3) treat
juvenile offenders equally throughout the state; and (4) collect and
distribute information concerning juvenile offenders to law
enforcement agencies. 43 The funding'" provided by the VRJOA
must be used by' qualifying states for programs specified by the Act.
These programs include: hiring additional personnel such as judges,
prosecutors, or probation officers; collecting juvenile criminal
141. S. 10, sec. 102(a), § 5032(e). "No juvenile sentenced to a term of imprisonment shall
be released from custody simply because the juvenile reaches the age of 18 years." Id.
142. S. 10, sec. 302(b), § 204(h). To qualify for grants under the VRJOA, a State must
make reasonable efforts to ensure that
juveniles age 14 and older can be prosecuted under state law as adults, as a matter
of law or prosecutorial discretion for a crime of violence (as that term is defined in [18
U.S.C. § 16]) such as murder or armed robbery, an offense involving a controlled
,substance (as defined in [21 U.S.C. § 802]), or the unlawful possession of a firearm (as
that term is defined in [18 U.S.C. § 921(a)] or a destructive device (as that term is
defined in [18 U.S.C. § 921(a)]).
S. 10, sec. 302(b), § 204(h)(3). Thus, the VRJOA appears to remove state juvenile judges from
the decision whether to transfer a juvenile offender to criminal court. Instead, the VRJOA
requires states to allow prosecution "as a matter of law or prosecutorial discretion." S. 10, sec.
302(b), § 204(h)(3)(A). This requirement seemingly forces states to replace judicial waiver
approaches, or at least supplement them, with statutory exclusion or prosecutorial discretion
transfer mechanisms. See supra note 30 for discussion of transfer mechanisms.
143. S. 10, see. 302(b), § 204(h)(3)(A)-(D).
144. One-quarter of one percent (0.25%) of the amount of funding available for incentive
block grants is allocated to each state. S. 10, sec. 302(b), § 206(a)(1)(A). Of the remaining
funds, each state is to receive "an amount that bears the same ratio to the amount of remaining
funds ... as the juvenile population of such State bears to the juvenile population of all the
States." S. 10, sec. 302(b), § 206(a)(l)(B).
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records, fingerprints, and photographs; and incarcerating violent
juvenile offenders for longer periods of time.'45 The VRJOA funding
could also be used by states to share juvenile records with other
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. 46
While the VRJOA represents a desirable step towards removing
the often artificial distinction between juvenile and adult offenders,
several amendments would improve the bill. First, the VRJOA should
contain provisions requiring states to keep and maintain records of
violent juvenile offenders as a condition of receiving federal funding.
Congress should also expand these requirements to provide greater
access to juvenile records. At a minimum, criminal and juvenile
records of juvenile offenders should be provided to school officials.
Providing greater access to the records of violent juvenile offenders
would enhance the protection of society in several ways. First, school
officials could inspect the criminal background of violent offenders
and take necessary precautions to ensure the safety of students and
teachers. Second, providing these records to both juvenile and
criminal courts would allow judges to make more accurate
predictions of future criminal behavior. Finally, the maintenance of
these records could serve as a deterrent to some juveniles if they
know their records will be no longer be expunged once they reach the
age of majority.
Second, Congress should not mandate the criminal prosecution of
juveniles who commit drug offenses because these offenses are not
inherently violent. While drug offenses may involve crimes of
violence, these acts would be covered by other provisions. In
addition, drug offenses are not necessarily crimes of depravity. A
juvenile charged with drug distribution may have acted purely out of
an economic motivation. Moreover, rehabilitation may be a more
effective alternative for juveniles charged with drug offenses than
145. S. 10, sec. 302(b), § 204(hX2).
146. S. 10, sec. 302(b), § 204(h)(2)I). Federal grant money could be used by states "for the
development and implementation of coordinated multijurisdictional or multiagency programs
for the identification, control, supervision, prevention, investigation, and treatment of the most
serious juvenile offenses and offenders." Id.
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those charged with the commission of violent crimes.
Third, the VRJOA requirements that states must fulfill to qualify
for federal funding should not apply universally to every state. States
maintaining effective policies for controlling the commission of
violent juvenile crimes should be excepted from the provisions
requiring the criminal prosecution of juveniles who commit violent
crimes. Only states with violent juvenile offense case rates over a
certain number of cases'47 per 1,000 youth at risk 4' should be subject
to these federal regulations.
CONCLUSION
While juvenile courts continue to play a useful and important role
in overseeing the rehabilitation of the majority of juvenile
delinquents, the juvenile court system is ineffective at handling the
relatively small portion of juvenile offenders who commit serious
violent crimes. In most cases, such juveniles are less amenable to
rehabilitation than juveniles who commit non-violent crimes. As a
result, the potential risk to society by releasing these violent
offenders following an unsuccessful attempt at rehabilitation is
unacceptably high. Despite the danger presented by violent juvenile
offenders, some states refuse to punish these offenders in proportion
with their crimes. Accordingly, to ensure the adequate protection of
society, Congress should enact legislation that provides federal
funding for juvenile justice programs to states allowing the criminal
prosecution of violent juvenile offenders.
Joseph F. Yeckel*
147. The number of cases per 1,000 youth at risk should be adjusted to account for the
varying demographics of the states. Nationally, in 1994 there were 12.1 person offense cases
per 1,000 youth at risk. PERSON OFFENSES 1994, supra note 114, at 1.
148. "Youth at risk" is defined as youth age 10 or older who are potentially subject to the
original jurisdiction of the juvenile court according to the laws of their state.
* J.D. 1997, Washington University.
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